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ABSTRACT
The Arab capitulation in the Six Day War was posited to stimulate 
the so-called Islamic resurgence in the region since the 1970s, which 
several scholars see as a sign of Islamic resistance to the Western 
cultural presence within the Arab world. This article argues that 
Islamizing the con!ict began well before the 1967 defeat, and that the 
hegemony of the Islamist discourse has been made possible owing 
to its penetration into mainstream political and media discourses. It 
is also argued that by ‘religionizing’ the Palestinian–Israeli con!ict, 
Islamists provide a new narrative to reshape and reframe the 
perception of this con!ict as being religious rather than political in 
nature. The article takes the Muslim Brotherhood as a topical case 
study, demonstrating how its print and digital media highlighted 
the Islamization of the con!ict with Israel and providing frequent 
references to the 1967 defeat as evidence of God’s wrath meted out 
on Arab rulers, not only for abandoning the Islamic State project, but 
also for oppressing Islamist movements.
Commemorating the 10th anniversary of the 1967 Israeli conquest, the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB)’s magazine al-Dawa, provided an ‘Islamic perspective’ in its analysis of the defeat. This 
defeat was regarded as the natural consequence of driving out Islamist movements, ‘Islam 
could not join the war, because it was banished behind bars as part of the intentional Zionist 
plan to imprison the Islamic movement before Israel could wage any attack’.1 The defeat, as 
argued in subsequent issues, was said to have provided the pretext for the Jews to destroy 
the Aqsa Mosque; indeed, the o"cial statements by the Brotherhood, and up until their 
accession to power in 2012, a"rmed their view of the Palestine issue as an Islamic issue par 
excellence and not a political con!ict, thereby viewing it solely from a religious 
perspective.
The Arab capitulation in the Six Day War was posited to stimulate the so-called Islamic 
resurgence in the region since the 1970s, which several scholars2 see as a sign of Islamic 
resistance to the Western cultural presence within the Arab world. If modernization spurs 
1Al-Dawa, June 1977.
2See e.g., Youssef M Choueiri, ‘The political discourse of contemporary Islamist movements’, in Abdel Salam Sidahmed and 
Anounshirvan Ehteshami (eds), Islamic Fundamentalism (Boulder: Westview, 1996); John Esposito, Islam and Secularism 
in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Company, 2000).
© 2017 British Society for Middle Eastern Studies
CONTACT Noha Mellor   noha.mellor@beds.ac.uk
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
AQ1
AQ2
CBJM 1360009 
2 August 2017
Initial
CE: ER QA: XX
Coll:XX QC:XX
2   N. MELLOR
nostalgia for the past as a direct reaction to the rapid modern social changes, it also gives 
rise to religious resurgence such as the so-called re-Islamization of the Arab world and other 
Muslim countries. However, rising Islamism not only posed a threat to the existing Arab 
rulers but also ‘Islamized’ the Palestinian–Israeli con!ict. That con!ict began as a rivalry 
between two national movements, namely, Zionism and Palestinian nationalism, but, fol-
lowing the 1936 Arab revolt, it became a con!ict that several Arab states that had gained 
independence in the 1950s regarded as a Western ploy to weaken pan-Arab nationalism.3 
The Islamization of the con!ict, however, ‘entails several consequences: a certain conceptu-
alization of the con!ict’s causes and sources through religious-Islamic lenses; a perception 
of the desirable solution; and the provision of the motivation and justi#cation for a speci#c 
mode of conduct in order to achieve that goal’, as Litvak argues. This perception of the con!ict 
therefore becomes ‘a battle between two rival religions, Islam and Judaism, or between two 
opposing absolutes’.4
Yvonne Haddad,5 on the other hand, posits that the Islamist ideology ‘was not created 
by the war, but the latter’s outcome provided a framework for projecting and explaining a 
perception that seemed to be validated by subsequent policies of the United States and 
Israel’. There was, indeed, a tendency to call for ‘renewal of faith’ in the wake of the defeat, 
which could be regarded as a natural reaction, especially as Nasser himself referred to it as 
a reminder from God to Muslims to ‘purify their souls’.6 Resorting to faith was not just con#ned 
to Muslims; in fact, in May 1968, Pope Cyril VI of Alexandria announced the apparition of the 
Virgin Mary on top of St Mark’s Coptic Church in the neighbourhood of Zeitoun. Nasser’s 
government used that occasion to raise people’s morale by suggesting that the apparition 
was a sign from God of an imminent victory, because ‘Saints and martyrs only appear in 
times of crisis to support [the people]’.7 Muslim nations such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan 
shared similar sentiments during the Islamic Congress in Mecca in October 1967, referring 
to the war as a ‘Zionist aggression against the Holy Shrines’, although there was ‘no outbreak 
of religious tension or persecution’ in either Syria or Egypt immediately after the war.8 The 
Islamists projected the defeat as a divine punishment for trusting foreign ideologies such 
as Socialism, as the basis for modernization.9  The respected Sheikh Shaarawi (d. 1998), whose 
widespread popularity earned him the title of ‘Preacher of the century’, revealed that he had 
personally prayed to God in gratitude for the defeat, because it obliterated Egyptian Socialism 
(referring to the Nasserite regime), which he regarded as atheistic.10
In this article, I argue that Islamizing the con!ict began well before the 1967 defeat, and 
that the hegemony of the Islamist discourse has been made possible owing to its penetration 
into mainstream political and media discourses. I also contend that, by ‘religionizing’ the 
con!ict, Islamists provide a new narrative to reshape and reframe the perception of this 
3Meir Litvak, The Islamization of the Palestinian–Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas. Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 34(1), 1998, 
148–163, p. 148.
4Litvak, 1998, 148.
5Yvonne Haddad, Islamists and the ‘Problem of Israel’: The 1967 Awakening. Middle East Journal, Vol. 46 (2), Spring, 1992: 
266–285, p. 266.
6L. M. Kenny, The Aftermath of Defeat in Egypt. International Journal, Vol. 23, No. 1: 97–108 (Winter, 1969), pp. 105–106.
7Sadeq Jalal Al-Azm, Naqd al-Khitab al-Deeni. 2nd edition (Beirut: Dar al-Talia, 1970), p. 176.
8Kenny, 1969, 105–106.
9Haddad, 1992, 267.
10Nasr Hamid Abu Zeid, Naqd el Khitab el-Deeni (Cairo: Sina Publishing, 1994), pp. 71–72.
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con!ict as being religious rather than political in nature. The article takes the Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) as a topical case study, demonstrating how its print and digital media 
highlighted the Islamization of the con!ict with Israel, providing frequent references to the 
1967 defeat as evidence of God’s wrath meted out on Arab rulers, not only for abandoning 
the Islamic State project, but also for oppressing Islamist movements. The article focuses on 
the Egyptian face of this movement, which later branched out into di$erent countries across 
the world, and on selected examples from its print and digital media to reach out to the 
general public, both inside and outside Egypt, while enforcing the MB’s position vis-à-vis 
the political establishment.11 The MB media formed a communicative platform to dissemi-
nate their values; analysing their media messages can help to understand the development 
of the Islamization of the narratives, particularly with regard to the Palestinian–Israeli con!ict. 
The MB’s founder, Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), realized the power of the written word in 
reaching out to larger audiences, and this is perhaps why the movement ‘turned journalism 
into a major agency with overriding Islamic goals’.12 The movement’s publications were gen-
erally a useful tool for rebutting accusations levied at the MB, mobilizing supporters, voicing 
the MB’s response to governmental policies and providing a platform to explain the MB’s 
own decisions. The Brotherhood’s publications were commonly occupied by providing views 
rather than news. Contributors to those magazines were mainly members and supporters, 
in addition to the General Guides; consequently, their ethical and religious capital was far 
more important than their professional journalistic skills.
The following sections elaborate on the role of religious narrative and religious nation-
alism as the bedrock for shifting the public perception of the Palestine issue, thereby ren-
dering rather super!uous the political negotiations; examples from the MB publications 
illustrate how they have Islamized this political con!ict.
Religious narrative
Roberto Franzosi13 explores the importance of narrative in social analysis, and how the anal-
ysis of linguistic features can guide our understanding of narrative stories. These features, 
for example, could include the scrutiny of characters, following Propp’s classi#cation of the 
roles of villain, donor, helper, dispatcher, sought-for person, hero and false hero. This narrative 
analysis is ‘linked to a wealth of background knowledge that readers consciously or uncon-
sciously bring to the text in the construction of meaning’.14 It is ‘through narratives that we 
come to know, understand and make sense of the social world, and it is through narratives 
and narrativity that we constitute our social identities’15; thus, everything we do ‘from making 
families, to coping with illness, to carrying out strikes and revolutions is at least in part a 
result of numerous cross-cutting relational story-lines in which social actors #nd or locate 
themselves’.16 This type of narrative includes several features such as relationality of its parts, 
11For a detailed discussion of the MB media, see Noha Mellor, Voice of the Muslim Brotherhood (New York: Routledge, 2017).
12Uri M Kupferschmidt, Literacy, Illiteracy and Censorship in the Tradition of the Muslim Brotherhood, in Philip Sadgrove (ed.) 
Printing and Publishing in the Middle East. Journal of Semitic Studies, Supplement 24 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008): 165–184, p. 170.
13Roberto Franzosi, Narrative Analysis—or Why (and How) Sociologists Should be Interested in Narrative. Annual Review of 
Sociology, Vol. 24: 517–554, 1998, pp. 523–524.
14Franzosi, 1998, 545.
15Margaret R. Somers, The narrative constitution of identity: A relational and network approach. Theory and Society, Vol. 23: 
605–649, 1994, p. 606.
16Somers, 1994, 607.
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causal emplotment, selective appropriation and temporality.17 Narratives are thus ‘packed 
with sociological information’; the story can include an initial state, and then disruption, 
followed by a new state and a #nal equilibrium, or before and after moments.18
The Islamist narrative of cultural incursion and the threat to erode Islam can be classi#ed 
as a ‘public narrative’, or one that is attached to cultural formation and not merely to one 
single individual.19 Central to this new narrative are the religious texts (particularly the Qur’an 
and Hadith) as the only legitimate source on which to draw, in order to conceptualize political 
con!icts. The narrative draws on a story and a plot or the ‘skeletal description of the funda-
mental events’ versus the arranged and connected events in the story as presented to the 
reader.20 This narrative has become so hegemonic that it has been adopted by both main-
stream regimes and mainstream media.
There are indeed certain discourses that can dominate the political sphere and become 
hegemonic through the process of ‘recontextualization’ or ‘the appropriation of elements of 
one social practice within another, placing the former within the context of the latter, and 
transforming it in particular ways in the process’21; where a hegemonic discourse proliferates, 
di$erent domains and ‘di$erent social actors will represent them di$erently according to 
how they are positioned within the practice’.22 The political #eld, as the most powerful #eld 
in society, is a battle in which diverse groups struggle to change power (im)balances and 
strive for hegemony. This desire for supremacy also encompasses discursive hegemony, or 
a selected construction and de#nition of reality, which, in itself, is an interactive process23; 
consequently, each group within the political #eld strives to legitimize its argument regard-
ing ‘truth’ by using a set of discursive practices. This discursive process draws on intertextu-
ality and interdiscursivity.24 Intertextuality refers to the way texts are linked to each other in 
order to arouse attention and interest. Interdiscursivity, which is closely connected to inter-
textuality,25 refers to the way di$erent discourses and genres merge within a communicative 
event, such as the use of extracts from the Qur’an and Hadith in political speeches or media 
articles. This process of intervention, argues Fairclough,26 not only is the transfer of a dis-
course into a new domain but also signi#es a new means of appropriating and re-contex-
tualizing this discourse. The regime, for instance, can draw on religious educational discourse 
to garner mass support among Islamists, thereby attributing speci#c norms and values to 
the education #eld.27 Islamic discourse can likewise be used to appropriate a political dis-
course, such as the Palestinian–Israeli con!ict, through the lens of speci#c religious texts, 
thus limiting the potential for negotiation and reconciliation to solve this con!ict. If the 1967 
defeat provided a political opportunity for Nasser’s opponents—particularly the 
17Somers, 1994, 616.
18Franzosi, 1998, 519–521.
19Somers, 1994, 619.
20Franzosi, 1998, 519.
21Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 32.
22Fairclough, 2003, 215.
23Maarten A Hajer, Doing discourse analysis: coalitions, practices, meaning. In: Van den Brink, Margo/Metze, Tamara: Words 
Matter in Policy and Planning. Discourse Theory and Method in the Social Sciences (Utrecht: Netherlands Graduate 
School of Urban and Regional Research, 2006): 65–76, p. 72.
24Fairclough, 2003.
25Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change (Cambridge: Polity, 1992).
26Fairclough, 1992.
27Aziz Talbani, Pedagogy, power and discourse: transformation of Islamic education. Comparative Education Review 40(1), 
1996, pp. 66–82.
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Islamists—to attack Nasserite policies, the dominance of the Islamic discourse has provided 
an equally powerful discursive opportunity for the Islamists to have their voice heard.
The MB, for one, publicized itself as a movement with political demands tightly enmeshed 
within the religious reforms it sought, which can be summed up in its call to be ruled by 
Islam and Islamic ethos. Their Islamization of the Palestinian–Israeli con!ict has been part 
of the MB’s attempt to propagate its unique sense of nationalism, anchored in Islam and not 
in territorial nationalism, as will be explained in the following section.
Religious nationalism
Religion, and particularly Islam, has long been celebrated as the glue that binds the majority 
of Egyptians to a large, worldwide Islamic community. Religious nationalism is manifested 
in the relationship between nationalism and Islam, and the way that the state can draw on 
Islam to rationalize its politics, while social movements and civil society can draw on Islam 
to substantiate their demands for social change. Religious nationalism then rivals secular 
nationalism, which was upheld during colonial rule and adopted by the educated elites. 
Religious nationalism depends on the collective moral values within society, and it may be 
a reaction to the failure of applying Western models of development.28 Religious nationalism, 
moreover, blurs the borders between the public, religious and private spheres: public and 
private realms should conform with the religious values and teachings in order to ensure 
social justice and freedom.29 Brubaker30 contends that a spiritual or godly nationalism, 
de#ned as a religious form of nationalism, does not apply neatly to the Islamic world, because 
the latter does not form one sovereign nation with clear political legitimacy: each country 
claims its own representation and resources distinct from the other Islamic nations, even 
where Islamist movements in each of those countries seek to gain more political power.
During the early part of the twentieth century, Egyptians were navigating between dif-
ferent currents of imagining their own national identity: one that glori#ed Islam as the basis 
of this identity, and another that glori#ed Egyptian Pharaonic history. This clearly distin-
guished Egypt from the rest of the region. The liberal Wafd party, for instance, o$ered a new 
vision of Egyptian unity, based on secularist nationalism, but its appeal was rather limited 
among the Nationalist Party’s old guard who had joined the Young Muslim Men’s Association 
(YMMA) in 1927.31 It was also that environment which paved the way for a populist move-
ment—the Muslim Brotherhood—to distinguish itself from the YMMA which ‘was essentially 
an urban organization with its roots #rmly #xed in the educated classes’.32
The Brotherhood o$ered a new sense of Islamic nationalism based on three aspects, the 
Egyptian nation, Arabism and Islam, because one, according to the Brotherhood, cannot 
take preference over the other, for the three are intertwined. Loyalty to Egypt means exalting 
Egypt’s position as the quali#ed leader of the Arab world, and the unity of Egypt and the 
28Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1993), pp. 194–195.
29Ira M. Lapidus, ‘Contemporary Islamic movements in historical perspectives’, Policy Papers in International A!airs, 18 
(Berkeley: University of California, 1983).
30Rogers Brubaker, Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches. Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 18, 2012, Issue 1: 2–20.
31Mohamed Aboulkhir Zaki, Modern Muslim Thought in Egypt And Its Impact on Islam in Malaya. Unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of London, 1965, p. 231.
32Zaki, 1965, 243.
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Arab world would ultimately mean the unity of the Islamic umma.33 The Brothers have always 
declared their belief in Islam as deen wa dawla or a religion and a code for state a$airs, and 
it is this intertwining of Islam and politics that makes it di"cult to see the Brotherhood media 
messages solely through the lens of religious media; its media rather represented a new 
voice calling for an all-encompassing Islam that would provide the solution to all political 
and social ills. The MB movement had rapidly expanded during the 20 years of Hasan al-Ban-
na’s leadership, but, instead of helping the nationalists in their struggle against the British 
presence in Egypt, argues Tareq al-Bishri,34 the MB ended up diverting the public energy 
and mood away from those nationalistic goals. The MB sought to renew the Egyptian identity 
through its Islamization in an attempt to rid Egypt of the in!uences of Western cultural 
imperialism.
The 1952 coup drastically changed the political scene in Egypt. It was initially supported 
by the Brotherhood, whose main concern was to re-open the case of al-Banna’s assassination, 
con#dent of the army o"cers’ dismay regarding the killing of the MB’s founder. Following 
the alleged MB’s foiled attempt to assassinate Nasser in 1954, however, the MB was dissolved 
and its press con#scated. That period is what the MB de#nes as mihna or crisis, and it was 
during that time that members were imprisoned and tortured, and even some were executed 
under Nasser’s rule. The movement could have been completely eroded here, even in the 
wake of the defeat of the Six Day War, which was a huge blow to Nasser’s regime. The political 
opportunity manifested in Sadat’s policy, on the other hand, allowed the Islamist movements 
to !ourish, in an attempt to curb the growing socialist and communist trends, which was 
instrumental in giving the Brotherhood movement another chance to revive its mission.
There is no doubt that the 1967 defeat damaged Nasser’s authority, although it did not 
totally destroy it. The defeat ignited riots, particularly among students in Mansoura and 
Alexandria; more than 5,000 students demonstrated in the latter city, and three night clubs 
were destroyed. The riots in Mansoura were claimed to be the work of the MB because many 
students came from the Islamic College there, whereas the Alexandrian student body was 
claimed to be from Marxist ranks. Five universities were closed down in anticipation of more 
riots, particularly in Cairo. The students in Cairo were furious, following the lenient sentences 
imposed on military o"cers held responsible for the defeat.35 The defeat prompted Nasser 
to initiate a series of reforms, such as the re-organization of the Arab Socialist Union and the 
end of martial law,36 while mitigating calls for isolation from Western culture. The ensuing 
protests in the Faculty of Arts in Cairo University demanded the banning of modern American 
literature from the curriculum. The then minister of education, Tharwat Okasha, condemned 
the protests by saying, ‘Any call for isolation from foreign cultures is a call for petrifaction, 
which will hurt the vitality and creativity of the people’.37
The liberal and leftist intellectuals in particular felt the severe repercussions of the war 
on the Arab cultural scene. Arab Intellectuals, argues the Egyptian Galal Amin,38 contributed 
to the feeling of humiliation and frustration by writing about the social ills, thereby adding 
to the prevalent mood of shame and self-hatred. The Syrian Georges Tarabichi regards the 
33Israel Gershoni & James P. Jankowski, Rede"ning the Egyptian Nation, 1930–1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002) pp. 95–96.
34Tariq Al-Bishri, Al haraka al siyassiya " misr (Cairo: Dar al Shorouq, 2002), p. 141.
35The Times (1968) Threat to Nasser regime grows after riots. November 27, 1968.
36Abbas Kelidar, Shifts and Changes in the Arab World. The World Today, Vol. 24, No. 12 (Dec., 1968), pp. 503–511, p. 507.
37Cited in Kenny, 1969, 105.
38Galal Amin, al-Muthaqqafun al-Arab wa Israel (Cairo: Dar el Shorouq, 1998).
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defeat as a mark of the loss of self-esteem in the Arab consciousness, and the loss of con#-
dence in the father of Pan-Arabism, Gamal Abdel Nasser.39 There was widespread disbelief 
that the defeat had actually occurred. This had concluded years of Egyptian overcon#dence 
and high expectations following the nationalization of the Suez Canal and challenging the 
tripartite attack in 1956; even Egypt’s advance in the 1973 war was rather short-lived, with 
the Egyptian army already talking about a peace treaty a few days after crossing the Bar-Lev 
line.
Nasser’s popularity was still felt in the street, despite the defeat, and his resignation was 
not accepted by the public perhaps because of the lack of an alternative leadership at the 
time.40 Nasser’s death on 28 September 1970 was therefore mourned by millions of Egyptians 
who took to the street to say their #nal goodbyes at Nasser’s funeral, and they stayed in the 
street until dawn, including veteran former Brother, Abdel Sattar al-Meligy41 as he recalled 
in his memoirs. Following Nasser’s death in 1970, Sadat became the president of Egypt 
(1970–1981), and he marked his commitment to the Islamic heritage, allegedly suppressed 
by Nasser. Sadat’s politics began with the release of the incarcerated Muslim Brothers to 
employ the Islamists against the Nasserites and Communists. The latter groups dominated 
public spaces such as most universities at the time, and it was a battle for the Islamists to 
seize power from those groups on campuses and syndicates, argues the former Brother, 
Abul Ela Madi,42 founder of al-Wasat Party; even religious spaces such as mosques took some 
time for the MB and other Islamists to penetrate, given the dominance of state 
preachers.43
The role of religion was nevertheless foregrounded in the political sphere, even during 
Nasser’s era. Nasser attempted to gain the people’s support, especially MB sympathizers, 
and he drew on the Brotherhood’s religious rhetoric in his public speeches, in which he 
likened the political mission of the Free O"cers to the Islamic jihad. He distinguished 
between lesser and greater jihad, where the former #nished with the end of colonialism, 
while the latter referred to the subsequent work in rebuilding the country.44 Islamists thus 
sought to colour their religious discourse with a political hue, whereas politicians sought 
to coat their political discourse with a religious veneer, including Nasser’s predecessors 
(such as Prime Minister Ali Maher and King Farouq45). This trend was to continue during 
subsequent decades with Presidents Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, drawing on religious dis-
course to legitimize their policies. It was indeed this vacillation between religious and polit-
ical discourses that has marked contemporary regional politics for a long time, and the 
Palestine question clearly demonstrates this increasing intertwining of religious and political 
discourses.
39Noha Mellor, The Egyptian Dream. On Egyptian National Identity and the Uprisings (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2016), p. 127.
40Peter Mansfield, Egypt since June 1967. The World Today, Vol. 24, No. 10 (Oct., 1968), pp. 414–420, p. 414.
41Al-Sayyed Abdel Sattar Al-Meligy, Tagrabati maa al-ikhwan (Cairo: al-Zahraa lil ilam al-Arabi, 2009).
42Abul Ela Madi, Gamaat al-unf al-dawliyya wa ta’welathia lil-Islam (Cairo: Maktabat al-Shurouq, 2006).
43Al-Meligy, 2009.
44Abu Zeid, 1994, 55.
45See, for example, Charles Tripp, Ali Mahir Pasha and the Palace in Egyptian Politics. Unpublished PhD thesis, School of 
Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1984.
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Hasan al-Banna’s project to Islamize politics
It is important to note that the Palestine question did not occupy most Egyptian politicians 
in the early part of the twentieth century; in fact, Saad Zaghlol, the celebrated national leader 
who headed the Egyptian Delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, presented 
the Egyptian demands as pertaining solely to Egypt and not to other Arab countries. He later 
refused to comment on the situation in Syria and Palestine, as he considered these matters 
were of little or no concern to him.46 Sheikh al-Azhar and Abul Fadl al-Jizawi rejected the 
appeal to support the Palestine cause in 1929, because it was a political issue, according to 
them, and calls by both the YMMA and the MB to see this question as an Islamic issue were 
ignored47; nonetheless, both the YMMA and the MB collaboratively campaigned for the 
Palestinian Arabs, which reached its peak during the Arab Revolt.48 Mayer49 contends, how-
ever, that neither the YMMA nor the MB was a mass organization in 1936, and thus their 
propagation of the Palestine con!ict could not be claimed to have swayed public opinion 
in Egypt. The late veteran Brother and MB historian, Mahmoud Abdel Halim,50 in fact, 
acknowledged that he only learned about the Palestinian issue when he joined the MB 
around 1936. He met the Palestinian mufti, Amin al-Hussaini, who visited the MB centre and 
explained the events as follows: ‘the British plot which drove naïve Muslim men [in Palestine] 
to sell their lands to the Jews so as to provide the latter with the opportunity to control the 
situation in Palestine’. The late Syrian MB leader, Mustafa al-Sibai (d. 1964), had expressed 
his frustrations with the Egyptians’ ignorance of what was happening in Syria and Palestine 
in one of his articles in al-Fath magazine in 1940, ‘We [Syrians] were often asked [by Egyptians] 
about the geographical location of Syria and the di$erence between Syria and Lebanon, or 
who ruled Palestine and Syria, and who the Syrian ruler was. This showed the [little] infor-
mation some of our Egyptian brothers had […] and that was the case with the educated 
[Egyptians], let alone the masses’.51
The Palestinian issue gained more attention after the Arab Revolt in 1936–1939, and the 
former prime minister, Mustafa al-Nahhas, who had previously dismissed the Palestinian 
issue as a foreign a$air, now sought to promote himself as the chief Arab leader to convince 
his British allies of Egypt’s role as a moderate force in the region.52 It was argued during that 
time that Hasan al-Banna showed admiration for both fascist leaders, Hitler and Mussolini, 
describing them as ‘leaders of modern nahda [renaissance] in Europe’, and praised their 
treaties with the Vatican as an indication that they did not seek to #ght religion but really 
wished to enforce its role in society.53
The MB had gained a larger membership by 1938 and had begun to focus on the 
Palestinian issue to pro#le itself as a revolutionary movement; in addition to preaching in a 
46Abd al-Fattah Muhammad El-Awaisi, The Muslim Brothers and The Palestine Question 1936–1947. Unpublished PhD 
thesis, University of Exeter, 1986, p. 43.
47el-Awaisi, 1986, p. 44.
48Israel Gershoni, The Muslim Brothers and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–39, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 22, 1986, No. 
3: 367–397, p. 379.
49Thomas Mayer, Egypt and the 1936 Arab Revolt in Palestine. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 19, 1984, No. 2: 275–287, 
p. 278.
50Mahmoud Abdel Halim, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimoun. Ahdath Sanaat al-Tarikh. Vol. 1. 1928–1948. 4th edition (Alexandria: 
Dar al-Dawaa, 1994), p. 88.
51Cited in Adnan M Rizk, Mustafa al-Sibai 1915–1964 (Damascus: Dar al-Qalm, 2000), p. 110.
52Mayer, 1984, 284.
53Awatef Abdel Rahman, Misr wa Filistin (Cairo: Dar Al Maarefa, 1980), p. 68.
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number of Cairo mosques, the movement used the periodical al-Nadhir54 to launch a series 
of articles about Palestine. Members also distributed several pamphlets in cafés and public 
o"ces, and called for the boycott of Jewish shops in Cairo. The pamphlets contained a list 
of such shops with a warning that, ‘every piaster paid to these shops goes to Jews in Palestine 
to buy weapons to use for killing Muslim brethren in Palestine’.55 Al-Banna used to send his 
followers to mosques on Fridays to inform Muslims about the plight of the Palestinians and 
to collect donations. One veteran Brother, for instance, went to a mosque in Cairo frequented 
by the upper class, and, after Friday prayers, he started preaching about Palestine, raising a 
copy of the Qur’an in his hand and saying that, ‘Brothers in Palestine are being killed because 
of this holy book, and the Jews and British troops force themselves into [Palestinian] houses, 
tear apart that book and stamp on it with their feet’.56
The Palestine issue was a recurrent theme in all the Brotherhood publications. The Brothers 
occasionally served as peripatetic preachers in mosques to warn Muslims against the ‘Jewish 
threat’ and pro#led the movement as the protector of Arab and Islamic land; in so doing, 
the Brotherhood Islamized the Palestine question by reducing it to an inevitable tension 
between the Jews and Muslims, instead of tackling the political roots of the con!ict. Al-Nadhir 
published a series of articles by Mahmoud Saleh entitled The Danger of Jews and the threat 
they posed to the Islamic world; each episode detailed the ‘plot’ woven by the Jews against 
Islam. Saleh claimed that the so-called Jewish plot began with Freemasonry, which had 
incited rebellion across Europe, followed by the Marxist ideology, which reiterated the call 
for rebellion. He also accused the Jews of controlling the #elds of ‘intelligence, brokering, 
arms sales, and media’. There was a tendency to label Jews as enemies of Islam, and according 
to Brother Saleh Ashmawy, Jews were the historic enemies of Muslims who still carried that 
hatred.57
al-Nadhir’s editorials expressed similar sentiments, and one of them condemned the 
appointment of an Egyptian Jew to serve as Egypt’s Consul in Paris:
The Egyptian Muslim and Arab government has appointed a new Egyptian consul in Paris, and 
he is a Jew. This is a dubious choice. The number of Egyptian Jews is no more than 22,000, so how 
would any of them represent an Islamic country of millions of people? The Consul represents the 
country and its laws and regulations [including] marriage and divorce, and as the king’s deputy, 
receives information on state a$airs and commercial and economic matters regarding our trade 
with the outside world; because this Jew has no fatherland and no nationality, appointing him as 
Consul is like appointing a spy in the ministry of foreign a$airs. We ask the ministry to justify the 
selection, when it could have chosen an Egyptian [Muslim] man who could be more suited and 
more quali#ed for the job. The Muslim ministry should know about people’s rumours regarding 
Yousef Qattawi Pasha, a Jew and head of the Egyptian Chamber of Commerce, who might have 
had a say in this selection; as if it were not enough that Jews control internal a$airs, now we 
give them the right to represent us abroad, too.58
Another of al-Nadhir’s editorials59 penned by al-Banna described how the MB’s headquarters 
had been raided by the police searching for, and con#scating, hundreds of copies of a booklet 
54The magazine was launched on 30 May 1938, marking the tenth anniversary of the movement. It ceased on 16 October 
1939.
55Abdel Halim, 1994, 174.
56Abdel Halim, 1994, 91.
57Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, 27 June 1946.
58Al-Nadhir, issue 14, 28 August, 1938.
59Al-Nadhir issue 9, 24 July, 1938.
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entitled Fire and Destruction in Palestine. This was an 80-page booklet, produced by the Higher 
Arab Committee in Palestine, containing more than 50 gruesome images of people being 
tortured, and depicting British soldiers allegedly tearing up copies of the Qur’an. The booklets 
had been sent to the Brotherhood for distribution across Egypt, and the MB had managed 
to circulate thousands of copies across the country, leaving only a few hundred copies in 
their headquarters. Al-Banna proudly admitted to the possession of the booklets, and even 
gave himself up to the police, but no charges were brought against him. ‘The Ikhwan went 
many times before the prosecution and o$ered themselves for interrogation and even impris-
onment, but the prosecution service, God forgive them, refused our appeal […] this time 
we’ll ask them to either charge us, if we have committed a crime, or return the booklets to 
us’, he wrote in the editorial.
The Brotherhood employed a variety of tactics to associate their movement with the 
Palestine issue in addition to the articles published about the ‘Jewish threat’ and the circu-
lation of pamphlets. It used the mosques to urge Muslims to support the Palestinian cause 
and to spread the call to boycott Jewish stores in Cairo; it arranged demonstrations across 
Egyptian cities and provinces, such as those marking the anniversary of the Balfour 
Declaration in November 1938, and co-founded the Delta Committee in 1947 to collect 
donations to arm the Palestinians. Donations had been collected for the Palestinian cause 
since the mid-1930s, although one senior member admitted that the money was no longer 
meant to ‘help our jihadi Palestinian Brethren, because they did not need such help; wealthy 
Palestinian merchants already supported those jihadists’; instead, he said, the donations 
were to be spent ‘on dawa matters’.60 The Palestinian issue, like the missionary one, none-
theless provided an unparalleled opportunity for the Brotherhood to mark its morality pol-
itics, calling for an immediate urge to right a wrong, not by o$ering new policy ideas but by 
demonstrating the moral position of speakers.
Al-Banna attended a conference in Cairo in 1946 to discuss the end of Jewish migration 
to Palestine, and delivered a speech in Arabic that was rather contradictory: on the one hand, 
he said that he did not oppose the Jews’ migration owing to religious reasons because the 
Qur’an called for co-existence, citing the Qur’anic verse (29:46), ‘And dispute you not with 
the People of the Book’, and on the other hand, he said that the Qur’an warned against the 
Jewish threat from an economic and legal perspective, citing another verse (4:160–161), ‘For 
wrongdoing on the part of the Jews, We made unlawful for them [certain] good foods which 
had been lawful to them, and for their averting from the way of Allah many [people]. That 
they took usury, though they were forbidden; and their consuming of the people’s wealth 
unjustly; we have prepared for those among them who reject faith a grievous 
punishment’.61
The same trend continued within the MB following al-Banna’s death, and the Palestinian 
question was regarded as one episode of an ongoing religious battle between Muslims and 
Jews, ‘The Palestinian issue is the primary one for Islam and for Muslims, and the weak battle 
that took place four years ago [1948] was just the start of a greater battle in which all forces 
in the world will be allied against Islam; after the age of narrow-minded nationalism and 
scattered issues that divided the nation, Muslims needed one issue to unite their e$orts […] 
which could reveal their many enemies […] and more importantly, Muslims needed a front 
60Abdel Halim, 1994, 174.
61Abdel Halim, 1994.
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to remind them of their #ghting nature since the Saladin days, after a [long] period of humil-
iation, unprecedented in history’, warned al-Muslimun editorial published in November 1952. 
Said Ramadan, al-Banna’s son-in-law, launched al-Muslimun magazine in Cairo in March 1951, 
where it continued until 1954, after which it moved to Damascus when Ramadan !ed Egypt, 
and later moved with him to Switzerland in 1961.62 The magazine featured several articles 
attacking the Jews as enemies of Islam; for instance, the Azharite, Mohamad Abu Zahra, 
explained that the Qur’an dedicated a large part of its content to talking about Jews, in his 
series about them and the Qur’an, ‘because the Jews’, he wrote, ‘never wanted any good for 
Islam, and their view of themselves as the “chosen people” was “the work of Satan”’.63
A new genre of prison literature had also emerged in the post-Six Day War period, in 
addition to the MB’s publications and the General Guides’ memoirs.64 The expansion of Islamic 
publishing resulted in print editions of biographies and other popular history books such 
as prison memoirs and al-Banna’s biography being sold in Egypt and across the region; the 
books were ‘often sold expensively in Saudi Arabia, and the pro#ts were used to subsidise 
cheap editions’ in Egypt, making those ‘previously banned from any form of participation in 
public life’ becoming involved in historiography.65 The majority of those memoirs did not 
engage in critical analysis of the movement’s history, but focused primarily on the murder 
of al-Banna, which many saw as part of an ‘ongoing conspiracy against Islam’; the style ‘was 
Islamic, in the sense that more than a few stylistic similarities existed between the exemplary 
life of al-Banna and the sira [biography] of the prophet Muhammad’, while lacking any sub-
stantiated evidence such as academic references.66 One example was the memoirs of Zaynab 
al-Ghazaly, who led the Muslim Sisterhood section and was imprisoned under Nasser’s rule; 
in her memoirs, she claimed that angels surrounded her in her cell to protect her from her 
captors.67
The campaign against Nasser has remarkably continued, with numerous memoirs of 
senior Brothers who were imprisoned during his era, accusing him of scorning and rejecting 
Islam. The former General Guide, Hamed Abu Nasr,68 accused Nasser of being unreligious 
and not having ‘ever tasted Islam or any other religion’. Nasser was accused of idolizing Kemal 
Atatūrk, who had secularized Turkey, and also blamed for ‘destroy[ing] the Arabic language’ 
because he had adopted the vernacular in his speeches. This is far from true, however; the 
late intellectual Fouad Zakariyya argues that the Nasserite era (1952–1970) witnessed the 
establishment of new Islamic institutions and that ‘the Islamic doctrine was highly revered 
in the domains of general education, media, and o"cial addresses’. The confrontation 
between Nasser and the MB was one reason behind the depiction of the Nasserite regime 
as non-Islamic, argues Zakariyya.69
62Mohammad Fathi Ali Shoeir, wasa’il al-Ilam al-Matbua " dawat al-ikhwan al-Muslimin. Unpublished MA thesis, Al-Imam 
University, Saudi Arabia, 1983, p. 325.
63Al-Muslimun, January 1954.
64Kupferschmidt, 2008, 183.
65Yoav Di-Capua, Gatekeepers of the Arab Past (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), p. 314.
66Di-Capua, 2009, 317.
67Zeinab Al-Ghazaly, Ayyam min Hayati (Cairo: Islamic Publication and Distribution, 1999).
68Hamed Abu Nasr (1987).
69Fouad Zakariyya, Myth and Reality in the Counterparty Islamist Movement (London: Pluto Press, 2005), pp. 20–21.
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Jihad against the Jews
The decade of the 1970s provides an important watershed moment in the history of the 
Brotherhood in Egypt, with Sadat’s encouragement for such movements to thrive. The MB 
society in fact bene#ted from several political opportunities as well as resources: the latter 
were re!ected in the #nancial support it received from the Gulf States, particularly Saudi 
Arabia, while the former included openings in the political sphere such as Sadat’s release of 
MB members in the early stages of his rule. It was during that period that the Brotherhood 
managed to re-launch its al-Dawa magazine re!ecting the group’s ideology. Sadat, moreover, 
raised the slogan ‘State of Religion and Science’ and referred to the 1973 war as the ‘10th of 
Ramadan War’, fought with the slogan ‘Allah is Great’. The con!ict with Israel was then framed 
as jihad and as a continuation of the Prophet’s battles against the Jews, a concept reinforced 
in the MB’s printed media at that time.
Al-Dawa magazine, for one, focused on warning against four main enemies: Jewry, Crusaders, 
communism and secularism.70 The children’s corner even contained articles aimed at indoc-
trinating the young generation on the hatred of Jews, ‘Muslim lion cub, annihilate their [the 
Jews] existence, those who seek to subjugate all humanity so as to force it [humanity] to serve 
their satanic designs’, said one article.71 Jews were then depicted as a race ‘corrupt at its roots, 
full of duplicity, and the Muslims have everything to lose in seeking to deal with them: they 
must be exterminated’.72 The Brothers were therefore vehemently against the Egyptian–Israeli 
peace treaty, and dedicated several articles and editorials to justify their stance.
The Brotherhood launched a relentless campaign in al-Dawa against communism, seeing 
it as an extension of the anti-Muslim Russian and Zionist plot, which culminated in the 1967 
defeat by Israel,73 ‘[C] ommunism was born out of Judaism. Its principles, leaders and revolution 
were Jewish Zionists, and the establishment of the State of Israel, from the Euphrates to the 
Nile, was one main goal of the communist strategy’, but, according to the articles, the plot also 
involved the U.S.A. whose aim was to eradicate Islam and usurp the Muslims’ wealth.74 The 
Russians and the U.S.A., claimed al-Dawa,75 supported the Jews during the 1948 war. Al-Dawa 
magazine issued several warnings against normalizing relations with Israel or buying Israeli 
products.76 Jews were even dehumanized, ‘Even if they [Jews] try hard, they cannot be [like 
other humans] because this is how they were created’, arguing that Jews simply hated Christianity 
as much as they hated Islam and that ‘they want to rule the world as God’s chosen people’.77
What is noteworthy in the MB media output is the movement’s persistent attempts to 
re-write history by glorifying its role in the 1948 war against Israel (which ended in defeat), 
as an example of sacri#cial jihad, while magnifying the impact of the 1967 defeat as divine 
justice on Nasser’s regime for its crackdown on the Islamists. The MB media meanwhile hardly 
70Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt. The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984), p. 
111.
71Cited in Kepel, 1984, 112; see also Liwa al-Islam, November 1990.
72Kepel, 1984, 112.
73Scholars such as Tariq al-Bishri also believed that the Jewish leaders of the Communist movement in Egypt in the 1940s 
were close to the Zionist movement in Israel, which they supported in 1948. The aim of the Communist movement, according 
to al-Bishri (2002, p. 23), was to counteract the Islamic movement led by Islamic associations such as the MB and Young 
Egypt party; nevertheless, the Communist movement managed to attract a sector of the youth and enrich the political 
sphere at the time, argues al-Bishri.
74Al-Dawa, June 1977.
75Al-Dawa (July 1978).
76For example, al-Dawa, Sept. 1979.
77Al-Dawa, Oct 1979.
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published material about the impact of the 1973 war, save for its subsequent peace treaty, 
although this war was, and has been, exalted as an example of Egyptian heroism; in fact, 
former Egyptian military rulers excelled in constructing the narrative of the 1973 war as a 
sweeping victory for the Egyptian army, with Sadat as the ‘Leader of War and Peace’, and 
Mubarak as the initiator of ‘the #rst air strike against Israel’, miraculously leading to Egypt’s 
victory. This narrative has been re!ected in the curricula of schools and universities.78
The Palestine question has remained an Islamic issue for the MB, asserted by the former 
Supreme Guide, Hamid Abu Nasr in 1988, in an open letter to the kings, presidents and emirs 
of Arab countries, ‘We Muslim Brothers believe that the Palestinian issue is an Islamic issue 
par excellence, and its responsibility is incumbent upon each Muslim, whether ruler or ruled, 
because it is part of our creed and the pulse of our hearts, before being a piece of land 
usurped by occupiers. The Islamic and historical facts con#rm every day that the Zionists 
have nothing but hatred and deception for us and all humanity […]. The Palestinian people 
have chosen their path and continue with their intifada […] and Arabs and all Muslims now 
bear their historical responsibility in supporting this blessed intifada’.79 Celebrating the third 
anniversary of the Palestinian intifada, Liwa al-Islam magazine reiterated the Brotherhood’s 
support for the intifada, ‘the Palestine issue, as the Muslim Brothers understand it, is an 
Islamic issue and not an issue of one people, it is the issue of all Muslims […]; depriving the 
issue of its Islamic character does not serve anyone but the enemies of Palestine’.80
Zionism was an extension of the Crusades, argued Mohamed al-Ghazaly, a former Brother 
whose writings were regularly published in the movement’s outlets, ‘I was surprised to read 
Ronald Reagan’s words when he was at Windsor Palace, during his recent visit to Britain; he 
said […] that it was from that palace that the Crusades began to spread the Judeo-Christian 
values […]. The new crusades are led by men drawing on [the concept of the ancient] 
Crusades with Zionism. [These modern crusades] began with Lord Balfour in the U.K. and 
have ended with presidents of the U.S.A. in recent years’.81 The Brotherhood media discourse, 
whether magazines, prison tales or memoirs, consequently provided a tool for rearranging 
the past and contesting mainstream discourses.
The 1990s and 2000s also saw the proliferation of Islamic satellite channels, mostly funded 
by the Sala#sts and the MB,82 not to mention the new outreach opportunities opened up 
on the Internet. The MB experimented with the new Internet technology in 1998 to host its 
al-Dawa magazine in a new format such as www.aldaawah.org, registered through a com-
pany located in Chicago, U.S.A. and al-Shahed (https://ashahed2000.tripod.com).83 The sites 
focused heavily on the Palestinian issue, con#rming that the Brotherhood would never 
acknowledge the State of Israel.84
78Mellor, 2016, 136.
79Liwa al-Islam, June 1988.
80Liwa al-Islam December 1989.
81Liwa al-Islam, November 1990.
82Hosam Tammam, al-Fada’iyyat al-salafiyya. Hal tuqawem al-salafiyya almanat al-fada’iyyat lil tadiyon? Islamyun web forum, 
18 May 2009, https://www.islamun.net (accessed on 22 April 2016).
83Al-Amira Samah Farag Abdel Fattah, al-ilam al-gadid. Ro’ya min waqi al-solekiyat al-itisaliya li shabab gamaat al-ikhwan 
al-muslimin. unpublished manuscript, 2012, https://scholar.cu.edu.eg/?q=mediatizedconflict/node/43160 (accessed on 
18 November 2016). Some archived pages can be viewed using WayBackMachine available on https://web.archive.org
84The Palestinian activist Ibrahim Allosh posted a comment on ashahed2000 website, responding to an article by Jonathan 
Freedland in the Guardian, published on 17 October 2001. Freedland questioned the rationale behind the Arabs’ obsession 
with the Palestinian cause, and how the Israeli withdrawal of forces from Gaza could ever change the lives of Arabs and 
Muslims anywhere else in the region: ‘of course Mr Freedland was deliberately ignoring the bonds between Arabs and 
Muslims, cultural and national bonds, or Arabism and Islam’, wrote Allosh.
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The former Mubarak regime attempted to win the support of Islamists and appease their 
demands by controlling religious discourses at school. These groups resisted the attempts 
by providing an alternative dialogue, including a school system, while in#ltrating state insti-
tutions such as Al-Azhar, on the grounds that the society su$ered religious ignorance, moral 
decadence and the loss of its Islamic identity at the hands of despotic regimes.85 This explains 
the upsurge in the number of those applying for a discipline related to Islamic studies during 
the period 1995–2006: the number of students enrolled to study Qur’anic and Islamic courses 
constituted approximately 20 per cent of the total number of students enrolled in Humanities 
and Social Sciences in 2005–2006, or about 164,292 students.86
The MB won a massive 88 seats in the 2005 parliamentary elections, as a result of which 
they called for the support of resistance movements everywhere in Palestine, Iraq and the 
Golan Heights, the backing of boycott movements, and redrawing ‘Arab–US–Zionist’ rela-
tions. A report, detailing the Mb’s achievements between 2005 and 2009,87 condemned the 
government’s lack of response to the Israeli #lm ‘Closed Zone’, which, according to the MB, 
tarnished Egypt’s image and violated its sovereignty, because it implied that Egypt was 
behind the siege on Gaza, when it refused to allow a Palestinian child to pass through the 
Rafah Crossing. The MB declared its intention to reconsider international treaties in its man-
ifesto for the Shura Council by-elections in 2010, particularly Camp David, and to emphasize 
the legitimacy for resistance as an Islamic duty against the ‘Zionist enemy’ calling for any 
attempt to normalize relations with Israel.
The ‘religionization’ of political con!icts was not con#ned to the Palestine issue; the MB 
used the same discourse when tackling other regional crises such as the Iraq War (2003) and 
the recent Arab uprisings. It depicted Western countries and Israel as an alliance of plotters 
against the Islamic nations. Following the Arab uprisings, for instance, IkhwanOnline (the 
Arabic portal) repeated its warnings about the grand scheme against the Arabs and Muslims, 
singling out Professor Bernard Lewis as the mastermind of the new one:
Those who have not read history [books] think that what America did to Iraq—from occupation 
and division—was an impulsive action and a by-product of recent events […] but the great 
truth which they forget is that what is happening now is the enactment of the imperialist plot 
planned, articulated and publicized by global Zionism to divide the Islamic world and turn it 
into a ‘paper mosaic’ in which the Zionist entity [Israel] could rule […]. When we publish this 
dangerous document by Bernard Lewis, we aim to raise Muslims’ awareness of the plot, par-
ticularly that of the youth […] who have been subjected to the biggest brainwashing process in 
history by those working hard in the service of the Zionist-American project, and who ridicule 
such plans as a ‘conspiracy theory’, despite what we saw before with our own eyes in Palestine, 
Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan.88
Bernard Lewis was then introduced as the ‘Zionist Orientalist’, and the allegation seems to 
have been drawn from di$erent sources, including Oded Yonan’s document attributing all 
of them to Lewis; however, it is noteworthy that this particular allegation has also been 
circulating in mainstream media.89
85Sebnem Gumuscu, ‘Class, status, and party: the changing face of political Islam in Turkey and Egypt’, Comparative Political 
Studies, 43(7), 2010: 835–861.
86OECD, Reviews of National Policies for Education Higher Education in Egypt (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2010), p. 190.
87https://www.ikhwanwiki.com/index.php?title=%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AE%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%86_%D9%
88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%B1%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%86.pdf
88Fathi Shihab Eddin, mokhattat Bernard Lewis li tafteet al-alam al-islami. IkhwanOnline, 9 Jan. 2011, https://www.ikhwanon-
line.com/new/Article.aspx?SecID=344&ArtID=77565
89See, for instance, Abdel Rahim Ali’s interview on Ala Hawa Misr talk-show, An-Nahar station, dated 29 November 2016.
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During the MB rule (2012–2013), it released al-Horriya wal adala or Freedom and Justice 
newspaper as the voice of their Freedom and Justice Party. The front page of the #rst print 
edition of the newspaper, published on 20 October 2011,90 featured a statement by a Hamas 
leader claiming that Mubarak had asked Hamas to free Shalit (the alleged Israeli spy) ‘for 
nothing in return’ and the obsession with Israeli–Egyptian relations continued in later issues. 
The Israelis were claimed to be irked by the Arab Spring, according to a survey that ranked 
it as the #rst concern for them, followed by nuclear weapons.91 There were also allegations 
that the ‘Zionists have allocated one million dollars to anyone killing al-Qarni’, referring to 
the Saudi cleric, Ayad al-Qarni, allegedly one of the MB’s supporters in Saudi Arabia.92 There 
were also warnings that the ‘Arab absence’ from Central Asia had ‘allowed the Zionist and 
American lobby to extend its in!uence in the region’,93 and a further warning against the 
Zionist-American plan to divide Iraq by creating an Iraqi federation.94
During Morsi’s rule, however, the tone towards Israel became conciliatory, as illustrated 
in the letter sent by Morsi to the late Shimon Peres. Mohamad Habib, former Deputy General 
Guide, reprinted Morsi’s letter, which was leaked to Israeli media, including warm words such 
as, ‘Being desirous of maintaining and strengthening the cordial relations which so happily 
exist between our two countries’ and ‘[We] express to Your Excellency our sincere wishes for 
your happiness and for the prosperity of your country’.95 Habib harshly condemned the letter, 
expressing his deep regret that an MB leader could address an Israeli o"cial in such a con-
ciliatory style. This was indeed a radical turn for the MB leadership, especially if compared 
with their stance towards the former Israeli president Navon’s visit to Egypt on 26 October 
1980. The then General Guide Umar Tilmisani wrote that the day of Navon’s visit was ‘one of 
the saddest days on plighted peoples […] the day when he who is the most aggressive 
[person] towards the believers, has set foot in this pure land. People of Egypt were sur-
rounded by silent sadness when they saw their army o"cers saluting the representative of 
the butchers behind [the massacre of ] Deir Yassin, and those who usurped Muslim lands.96
The MB resumed its campaign against ‘Zionism and Crusaders’, following the overthrow 
of Morsi in 2013, and in 2015, Ikhwan’s website, Egypt Window, published an article dated 
30 May 2015 entitled ‘The Western Stance Toward the Brotherhood’ in which it argues that 
the events facing the whole region were part of a calculated plot against Islam, which the 
good [Muslims] ought to win in the end, and the MB has assigned itself the role of the caller 
to awaken those Muslims in their long jihad against the enemies. To support its allegations, 
the MB usually published materials that tended to rely heavily on extracts from the Qur’an 
and Hadith, and there is indeed an ‘extensive resort to Qur’anic exegeses’ in order to demon-
strate the depravity of the Jews and the roots of their enmity to Islam, and to show that the 
present con!ict is the direct continuation of the struggle the Jews waged against the 
Prophet’.97 Seen in this context, the Palestinian issue was a problem concerning an Islamic 
endowment (waqf) which the early Caliphs refused to divide, leaving it as a bequest to the 
entire Islamic world.98
90www."ponline.com/article.php?id=72
91Al-Horriya wal adala, 4 January, 2012, p. 12.
92Al-Horriya wal adala, 29 October 2011, p. 1.
93Al-Horriya wal adala, 29 October, 2011, p. 12.
94Al-Horriya wal adala, 30 October 2011, p. 13).
95Mohamad Habib, al-ikhwan al-muslimin bayna al-soud wal riyasa wa taakul al-shariya (Cairo: Sama, 2013), pp. 69–7.
96al-Dawa Nov. 1980.
97Litvak, 1998, 151.
98Litvak, 1998, p. 153.
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Conclusion
The Brotherhood’s hostility towards Israel featured heavily in the MB media discourse with 
regard to the Palestine question as an Islamic issue. The movement’s stance towards peace 
treaties with Israel oscillates, nonetheless, between acceptance and rejection, depending 
on its current political power. The MB’s stance towards jihad similarly swings between accept-
ing violence in the name of Islam (in the cases of Afghanistan, Hamas and Hezbollah) and 
rejecting it at other times (al-Qaeda).
The MB’s Islamization of the con!ict was generally part of the movement’s e$orts to 
propagate a global transnational movement and, hence, its interest in regional con!icts and 
the reluctance to support territorial nationalism in either Egypt or Palestine. It regarded 
instead the Islamic nations as part of a global Umma. The movement also considered the 
1967 defeat as a historical lesson to Arab rulers who adopted Western concepts such as 
socialism or nationalism. This did not mean, however, that rising Islamism was triggered 
solely by the Arab defeat in 1967; rather, it re!ects the shift in the political process, with each 
ruler of Egypt drawing on religious discourse to garner public support for his policies.99 
Hamas, founded in 1987 as ‘the underground wing of the Muslim Brethren movement in the 
Gaza Strip’, similarly propagated a religious perception of the con!ict by competing with 
‘the secular national Palestinian forces within the PLO, and in order to refute Zionist-Israeli 
claims to the land’.100 Hamas, for instance, compared the Palestinians to early Meccan Muslims 
who had to migrate to Medina with the Prophet because of their religious beliefs.101
If the Islamic discourse seems to have gained a strong foothold since the 1967 war, this 
has been largely due to the proliferation and hegemony of that discourse in mainstream 
media as well; both have deployed Islam as a political instrument while naturalizing religious 
discourse to ful#l the utilitarian duties of the state.102 This shows the powerful in!uence that 
religion has on political con!icts.103 Islamist discourse, like that adopted by the MB, imposes 
a certain religious understanding as the only truth while accusing anyone who challenges 
this understanding as opposing God’s will.104 Political con!icts are consequently transformed 
into religious con!icts and a zero-sum game, with dwindling chances of ever being resolved 
through political debates.
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